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explanationism

statements of the tendencies producing the phenomenon are retrospectively deducible
from the explanatory structure, which may itself come to be defined as a natural kind,
this model gives us the best possible grounds for attributing natural necessity and
necessary truth. The second mode of explanation, referred to as applied (or practical
or concrete) explanation, or the RRREI(C) model - a form that is essential when
conditions are fundamentally open - proceeds in a manner that is somewhat different.
First, a complex event or situation of interest is resolved into its separate components,
i.e., into the effects of its separate determinants; second, these components are then
redescribed in theoretically significant terms; third, a knowledge of independently
validated tendency statements is utilised in the retrodiction of possible antecedent
conditions, which involves working out the way in which known causes may have been.
triggered and interacted with one another su ch as to give rise to the concrete
phenomenon under investigation; whereupon, fourth, alternative accounts of possible
causes are eliminated on evidential grounds. This may be followed by identification
and correction, as in the pure model.
Subject to qualification, both models of pure (or theoretical) and applied (or practical)
explanation are operative in the social domain. But CR does not license the blind
imposition of results derived from reflection on the conditions of the natural sciences
to the social sphere. Rather, it is only in virtue of an independent analysis of the subjectmatter of the social (psychological, etc.) sciences (see PN), where it is shown that there
are knowable structures at work in the social domain partially analogous, but
irreducible, to those identified in nature, that a position is reached from which it is
possible to see that the characteristic modalities of explanation may apply equally well
in the social as in the natural sphere. Critical realists have thus supported a qualified
brand of naturalism stressing the specificity of the ways in which the movement from
manifest phenomena to explanatory structures is achieved in different domains. The
issue of how causal explanation can proceed in the context of a social realm
characterised as open, holistically constituted and dynamic is pursued by those critical
realists who elaborate upon the m ethod of CONTRAST EXPLANATION. See also
CAUSAL LAW; CRITICAL NATURALISM; EXPLANATORY CRITIQUE; Ruben 1990.
STEPHEN B. PRATTEN
explanationism. See INFERENCE.
explanatory critical reason. See EXPLANATORY CRITIQUE; RATIONALITY.
explanatory critical theoryt complex or explanatory critiquet (ECt) .
Comprises EXPLANATORY CRITIQUES, exercises in co CRETE UTO PIAS, and
theories of TRANSITION. Organically linked and articulated with EMANCIPATORY
MOVEMENTS (see also EMANCIPATORY AXIOLOGY), it provides empirically
grounded theories of the immanent possibilities of developing four-planar social being.
explanatory critique (EC) . CRITIQUE of a phenomenon that follows from
diagnosing that it is part of the explanation of why a false belief is held (cognitive EC), or
why some social or personal ill persists (NEEDS-based EC); explanatory critical reason is the
theory and practice of EC, a form of ethical naturalism. A (cognitive) EC is doubly critical;
it involves cognitive critique (falsity) of a belief and ethical critique of the cause of the
false beliefbeing held. Bhaskar has repeatedly urged the importance of one kind of EC:
ethical critique of a SOCIAL STRUCTURE that follows, CP, from a soundly established
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social science theory, in which are confirmed both the falsity of a widely accepted belief,
and the causal role of the structure in explaining why the belief is widely accepted. His
most detailed argument is in SR: ch. 2, § 6, 7; an earlier version is in ch. 2, § 6, and a
later development in D: ch. 3, § 7 (see also PF: app. 1; Collier I 994: ch. 6).
Bhaskar argues that, in the social sciences, if a theory, which confirms (I) that some
widely held belief is false and (2) that a prevailing social structure is an important causal
factor in sustaining the prevalence of this false belief, becomes soundly established in accordance with such uncontroversial cognitive criteria as empirical adequacy and
explanatory power - then (3) a negative ethical valuation of the structure follows, CP,
from the theory. Moreover, if a soundly established theory (the same or another)
confirms (4) that a certain activity may contribute to displacing the structure, then (5)
a positive ethical evaluation of the activity follows, CP, also. In some cases, the false
belief, e.g., that the structure is not causally implicated in the persistence of social ills,
may be an IDEOLOGICAL belief, one whose being held widely is a condition for the
structure's maintenance. Then, the inference to (5) amounts to a positive valuation of
EMANCIPATORY activities aimed at removing these ills.
EC has affinities with the modern ENLIGHTENMENT idea that scientific knowledge
informs human EMANCIPATION (Hammersley 2002) and, relatedly, with the quest of
early modern philosophers (e.g., Bacon and Descartes) to identify, for the sake of
eliminating them from scientific practices, the causal sources of the widespread errors
inherited from the past. These ideas, however, were developed in a way that depended
on a sharp separation of fact and value, generally associated with 'Hume's law', that
'ought' cannot be derived from 'is', or that value cannot be derived from fact (see
NATURALISTIC FALLACY).

In contrast, Bhaskar's argument maintains that from 'factual' proposals expressed
in the kinds of theories he describes (i. e., that certain beliefs are false and that holding
them is explained in a certain way), CP, value judgements follow. Clearly, knowledge
of the causes of false beliefs being held (especially ideological ones) - and, more
generally, knowledge of the causes of persistence ofsocial ills - can inform emancipatory
practices in important ways, for an ill cannot be removed without removing its causes.
Over and above this, however, Bhaskar claims that EC also has far-reaching
philosophical implications; that the possibility of EC refutes Hume's law, and that the
social sciences intrinsically bear an emancipatory impulse (SR: 169). These latter claims
have generated considerable controversy and they will be the principal focus of this
entry.
Bhaskar considers that, if the factual propositions, (1)/(2)/(4), are confirmed in
theories that are soundly established in accordance with uncontroversial cognitive
criteria, then the inferences from (1)/(2) to (3), and from (1)/(2)/(4) to (5), refute Hume's
law. On a common interpretation of Hume's law, that 'ought' is not logi.cally entail,edby
'is', however, the role of the CP clause ensures that it does not (Hammersley 2002). But
Collier (1994: 170) interprets the inferences as 'more like evidential or scientific than
deductive arguments', and I think that they are best expressed in the pragmatic, rather
than formal, mode: if one accepts that the factual proposals are confirm ed in
appropriate theories, then, CP, it is unintelligible to deny the value judgements. On
these interpretations, refuting Hume's law amounts to demonstrating that the inference
from the factual proposals to the value judgement does not involve the MEDIATION
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of any value judgements, in particular, that the CP clause does not hide any such
mediation.
Bhaskar's argument is that EC is possible in the social (and related) sciences. He
identifies instances - 'templates' (SR: 179) - of the two inference patterns in 'Marxist
analysis of IDEOLOGY, Nietzsche's analysis of the genealogy of morals and Freud's
analysis of repression and rationalisation' (Bhaskar and Collier 1998c: 386), and his
argument is intended to articulate their general features. Nevertheless, he seems to
stop short of endorsing that these analyses are confirmed in theories that are soundly
established in accordance with uncontroversial cognitive criteria; and, otherwise, he
offers no successful examples of EC . This points to a general feature ofBhaskar's mode
of argument. It proceeds, not from a critical analysis of actual, on-going research
practices in the social sciences and their established results, but rather from a
(TRANSCENDENTAL) ARGUMENT for conducting research in accordance with the
TMSA. This model proposes (among other things) that social phenomena, including
what beliefs are held, are partly causal products of (non-observable) generative
mechanisms, which include relatively enduring social structures, and which require
DEPTH-investigation for their identification. For Bhaskar, the possibility of EC , derived
from the TMSA, suffices to refute Hume's law, and to underlie one of the central tenets
of CR, that there is a rich interplay between fact and value rather than a sharp
separation between them . But, in the absence of critical reflection on successful
examples, it remains unspecified how EC might actually function in social scientific
inquiry, and what value judgem ents and specific directions for action might thereby
be supported. Sayer (2000a: 160) comments that the argument, claiming to refute
Hume's law, is 'strangely at odds with the experience of practical instances'.
Writers who are broadly sympathetic to CR have criticised Bhaskar's argument in
a number of different ways. Some of them , e.g., have rejected the TMSA as a
framework for social scientific inquiry (Chalmers 1988; Harre 2002; see also Rogers
2004); then, the only way to recover the argument would be to base it on the analysis
of actual successful examples, in which the inference patterns identified by Bhaskar
could be defended.
The lack of successful examples and, more generally, considerations pertaining to
actual social scientific practices and their relationships to actual emancipatory
movements, rather than the rejection ofTMSA, are also key to the arguments of some
other critics (Lacey 1997, 2002b; Sayer 2000a). These critics do not doubt that a rich
interplay - 'entanglement' (Putnam 2002) - between fact and value, and between
explanation and ethical critique, is essential in the social sciences. Nevertheless, they
question that Bhaskar's argument adequately captures this interplay, which may, e.g.,
have more to do with value judgements having factual presuppositions than with
logically deriving value judgements from facts (Lacey 1997). They maintain that the
interplay between fact and value in the social sciences needs to be unpacked in detailed
and specific ways before the emancipatory potential of the social sciences can be
discerned . This does not depend on the refutation of Hume's narrow logical claim
(which does not preclude value judgements having factual presuppositions), although
it does presuppose rejecting the Humean-inspired view that fact and value can be kept
separate and values kept out of the sciences (see also Lacey 1999).
Before turning to the criticisms in detail, some clarification will be helpful. Bhaskar,
appealing to the two inference patterns, affirms that the social sciences can be sources
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of novel value judgements. But, while he countenances no logical moves from values
to facts, he also recognises clearly that values are presupposed at the outset of inquiry,
motivating and directing it. Values play a role not only in the choice of problems to
investigate (see also Sayer 2000a), but also in the adoption of strategies that specify the
kinds of theories to pursue, the kinds of con cepts they will deploy, the kinds of
possibilities they are capable of identifying, and various methodological matters that
concern the procuring of relevant eviden ce (Lacey 2002b). Even the adoption of
strategies that incorporate the TMSA, which anticipates the possibility of structural
change, draws upon a view of human nature and the possibility of human
transformative agency, which underlies adopting emancipatory values (SR: 207). What
specific values are actually presupposed, and so what possibilities are considered worth
investigating (including the possible barriers to their actualisation and the possible
consequences of their further actualisation), may be drawn from 'a particular area of
existing progressive practice, which provides a model which we would like to generalise'
(Sayer 2000a: 163) or from actual emancip atory movements like those that constitute
the World Social Forum (Lacey 2002b). No facts may be inferred from these values,
not even the factual claim that there are genuinely actualisable possibilities of the kind
considered worth investigating. Factual claims must be appraised in the light of
available empirical evidence and strictly cognitive criteria (e .g., as mentioned above,
empirical adequacy and explanatory power), which are distinct from ethical and social
values. Although a theory, with components instantiating (I) and (2), may not be
developed and tested outside of the motivating context provided by particular values,
this does not imply that these values serve among the criteria of cognitive appraisal of
the theory. It is indispensable to Bhaskar's argument that no ethical values h ave been
presupposed in establishing the theories with respect to which he wishes to deploy his
inference patterns. Otherwise, at the outset, his claim to have derived a value judgement
from established facts would be trivialised .
Critics maintain that, in each of the inference patterns put forward by Bhaskar,
value judgements do play a m ediating role in the inference from (hypothetically)
confirmed factual premises to the value judgement that constitutes the conclusion - a
role that is disguised by the casual use of the CP clause - 'subject to a ceteris paribus
clause {... } one can move without further ado to (3]' (D: 261 - 2). Consider the
inference made from (1) and (2), CP, to (3). When does the CP clause obtain? According
to the critics, only if the following conditions (among others) are satisfied: (a) an
established theory confirms that the social structure, causally implicated in the false
belief being widely held, is not also a significant causal factor in sustaining a range of
positively valued phenomena; and (b) there are sound reasons to believe that there is
a feasible alternative structure (Sayer 2000a: 162, 168), which would not sustain the
same, comparable or worse social ills (including the cognitive ones) to those sustained
under the actual structure (Lacey 1997). Interestingly, Bhaskar notes that conditions
like these must be satisfied (SR: 185) but he quickly glosses over them , as if their
obtaining can readily be relied on. Yet value judgements are involved in accepting
both (a) and (b).
With respect to (a) this is immediately apparent, for valuations of a range of effects
of the social structure are involved. Moreover, those who hold the values that are highly
embodied in the social structure are not likely to endorse the value judgements needed
to mediate Bhaskar's inference. Sayer (2000a) calls Bhaskar's use of the CP clause
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'complacent' (158), in part because it glosses over condition (a), oversimplifies by
considering one factor at a time, and provides no grounds for considering the inference
to have normative force in the face of disagreements about value judgements. For
Sayer, this points to the need for CR to attend to developing a theory of valuative and
normative issues, and he does not think that inferences drawn from established results
in the social sciences will play a very significant role in that theory.
With respect to (b), when we limit it so that it refers only to cognitive ills, it is more
difficult to discern the involvement of value judgements. The proposition, (6), that an
alternative structure, which would not also sustain the widespread holding of false
beliefs, is feasible, is itself open to investigation in the social sciences. At the same time,
the infeasibility of alternatives, the negation of (6) [(-6)], is likely to be one of the beliefs
on which the stability of the structure depends, and which are presuppositions of
holding the values embodied in it - i.e., the structure is likely to be a causal factor in
sustaining that the belief in (-6) is widely held. Thus the normative force of the inference
depends on providing evidence for (6), a proposition of comparable status to (1) and
with a comparable role in making the inference to (3). Minimally, the CP clause hides
that there is greater complexity to the inference than first meets the eye.
Those who hold the values embodied in the structure will be predisposed to reject
(6), as well as to question the strength of the cognitive credentials of any alleged
confirmation ofit and the significance ofresearch conducted under the strategies that
supposedly produced it. We might put it: CP, they will deny that proposition (b), which
is implicit in the CP clause of Bhaskar's inference, can be upheld - where their own
CP clause signifies 'unless compelling evidence to the contrary is provided', but where
the values they hold nourish little motivation to conduct investigation on (b).
Bhaskar does discuss propositions of the type (6); their negations - ' There is no
alternative' - function within the TI.NA SYNDROME (D: 116), which is routinely deployed
in legitimations of predominant structures. This serves to bring attention to the
structure's causal role in maintaining the widely held belief in (-6). But having such a
causal source does not imply that it is false; evidence would need to be gained in inquiry
to show that. Bhaskar makes clear that evidence for (or against) (6) could be obtained in
empirical inquiries conducted under strategies that reflect the TMSA, but (as already
pointed out) he offers no examples ofsuccessful inferences of the two types and, therefore,
in view of the implicit role of(b) in the CP clause, no examples of propositions of type
(6) that are well supported empirically. Even so, as already indicated, he deploys his CP
clause with little commentary, almost as if the genuine plausibility (and not just logical
possibility) of alternatives is a consequence of the TMSA. It was pointed out earlier that
adopting strategies that reflect the TMSA is linked with (by way of the view of human
nature that it draws upon) holding emancipatory values. Among the (hypothetically)
factual presuppositions of holding these values is the feasibility of alternatives (Lacey
1997)- as the World Social Forum proclaims: 'Another world is possible'; if there were
none, attempting to further the embodiment of these values would represent only an
illusion (Lacey 2002b). Of course, that is not an argument for the truth of (b), but it is
one to adopt the stance: CP, accept (and act in the light of the assumption) that (b) is
true - where this CP clause, like the one deployed by those who hold the values
embodied in the structure, signifies 'unless compelling evidence to the contrary is
provided'. In this case, contrary to the earlier one, the values adopted provide motivation
to engage in investigation that, in principle, could confirm (b) (although it could also
disconfirm it). Rationally holding a set of values is always grounded in factual
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presuppositions (Lacey 1999: ch. 2); (a) and (b) are among the presuppositions ofholding
emancipatory values.
That is the context - where emancipatory values are held - in which Bhaskar's CP
clause may be deployed soundly 'without further ado'. This is not dogmatic, since
research conducted under the same strategies that leads to accepting (1) and (2), in
principle, might lead to the evidentially informed confirmation or undermining of(a)
and (b). Neither is it trivial, for the inferences might lead those who hold emancipatory
values to make new or modified value judgements, or to consolidate their commitment
to them, so that EC could have an important role in informing the activities of
emancipatory movements. But it does not refute Hume's law, and it does not show that
the social sciences have a significant role in the formation of values or the potential
seriously to challenge hegemonic value judgements.
When dealing with hegemonic social structures, it is unlikely that the CP clause will
ever be considered satisfied - except in the value-laden context described - and, thus,
it is unlikely that specific instances ofBhaskar's inferences will gain normative force that
cuts across value outlooks. Perhaps that explains why it is so difficult to produce actual
successful examples of EC. When we consider theories with a narrower focus, perhaps
successful examples will be forthcoming. Rogers (2004) has argued that the 'theory of
action' - a theory concerned with the effectiveness of professionals in dealing with
issues that require interpersonal competence and with effective interventions to
improve their effectiveness - provides a sound instance ofBhaskar's inference that has
general normative force or, more realistically, normative force for a wider range of
value outlooks. Here we do not always encounter the same kind of investment in the
values of the status quo, and the very context of seeking effective interventions provides
openness to alternatives, so that we can anticipate that any impasses concerning the
counterparts of (a) and (b) may be more easily resolved, although that does not mean
that they do not involve value judgements. If Rogers's analysis survives criticism, it
will suffice to show that EC, which carries normative force across a range of value
outlooks, is indeed possible. Then critical reflection on it and further instances that
may be offered should enable us to explore both the future horizons and the limits of
EC. This is of considerable importance and serves emancipatory interests, whether or
not EC serves to refute Hume's law or to provide a significant source of emancipatory
values. See also Edgley (1976).
HUGH LACEY
explanatory dialectic (dialectic of explanation) . See EPISTEMOLOGICAL
DIALECTIC.
expressive totality, expressive unity. See EXPRESSNISM; TOTALITY.
expressively veracious component. See El\1ANCIPATORY AXIOLOGY
Gudgement form) .
expressive-referential. See ALETHIA; HOLY TRINITY; TRUTH.
expressivism (intensionalism)/ extensionalism. Contrasting forms of
detotalisation or REDUCTIONISM, the former depending on illicit FUSION, the latter
on illicit FISSION. Denegation ofTOTALITY 'encourages a tendency towards {either}
analytical extensionalism or romantic expressionism, the non-dialectical or
undifferentiated restriction of REASON to purely analytical or else expressivist modes
of thought' (EW: 11 ), respectively.
The main philosophical error pinpointed by CR at 3L, (ontologi.ca~ extensionalism is the
denial of internal RELATIONALITY or intra-action, the void in irrealist thought

